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COMMENT
Pre-enforcement Review of
Administrative Orders to Abate
Environmental Hazards
David Montgomery Moore
The author discusses the availability of review of ad-
ministrative orders issued by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) under the major federal environmen-
tal statutes. When statutes are silent, the
appropriateness of pre-enforcement review is discussed
in light of congressional intent, the EPA's need for
prompt abatement of environmental hazards and the
constitutional requirements of due process.
I. Introduction
A basic tenet of our legal system is that aggrieved indi-
viduals be allowed review of government actions affecting
their rights. The right to judicial review is founded upon prin-
ciples of fairness and equity, and provides a means by which
society can protect itself from arbitrary government action.
With the growing concern for the environment and the sub-
stantial body of legislation passed in recent years to address
675
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environmental concerns, government agencies such as the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) are being given ever
broadening control over environmental affairs. Congress has
explicitly provided that some of this control is not always sub-
ject to judicial review.1
As part of its power to enforce the environmental laws of
the United States, the EPA is authorized to issue administra-
tive orders under most of the major federal environmental
statutes.2 The requirements of administrative orders range
from directing the recipient to clean up a hazardous waste
site, to enjoining the recipient from discharging pollutants to
land, water or air.' Statutory grants of authority for adminis-
trative orders can be broad. The language of some environ-
mental statutes authorizes EPA to issue "such orders as may
be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.""
1. See infra notes 89-231 and accompanying text.
2. This paper will focus on orders issued under the following federal environmen-
tal statutes: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) §§ 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1988); Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) §§ 3004, 3008, 3013(a), 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6924, 6928, 6934(a), 6973(a) (1988); Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 113, 303, 42 U.S.C. §§
7413, 7603 (Supp. 11 1990); Clean Water Act (CWA) §§ 309, 504, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319,
1364 (1988). This is by no means an exhaustive list of the EPA's authority for issuing
administrative orders.
3. Under RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988), the government has secured
relief in the form of preliminary injunctions ordering defendants to (1) clean up
drums, tanks, etc.; (2) restrict public access to sites; (3) provide alternate water sup-
plies; (4) develop and implement a plan to prevent further contamination; (5) provide
financial guarantees to insure implementation of plans; (6) restore groundwater and
other contaminated resources; (7) implement monitoring programs to determine ade-
quacy of cleanup; (8) restore sites and resources and (9) reimburse EPA for funds
expended in connection with an action at a site. See United States v. Hooker Chem.
& Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Waste Indus.,
Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 1984)(mandatory injunctive relief); United States v.
Price, 688-F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (alternate water supply); United States v. Seymour
Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982); United States v. Midwest Sol-
vent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980); United States v. Solvents
Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980) (monitoring program); United
States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980). See generally RIDG-
WAY M. HALL, TOM WATSON, JEFFREY J. DAVIDSON, DAVID R. CASE, & NANCY S. BRYSON,
RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTES HANDBOOK (7th Ed. 1987).
4. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). RCRA § 7003(a), which was
enacted four years prior to CERCLA, contained this identical language, except for the
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/9
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Under many of the major federal environmental statutes,
administrative orders are not immediately reviewable in the
courts.5 Congress has expressly precluded review of adminis-
trative orders under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)6
and the Clean Air Act (CAA).7
CERCLA is perhaps the best example of a statute which
precludes pre-enforcement review8 of administrative orders.
The recipient of a CERCLA order cannot challenge the valid-
ity of the order, its requirements, or the evidence and assump-
tions upon which the order was issued.9 The bar to review re-
mains until EPA chooses to enforce the order in federal court,
which only occurs if the recipient fails to comply with the or-
der.10 Thus, the recipient who questions the validity of the or-
der is put in a difficult position. The recipient may refuse to
comply and wait for the EPA to enforce the order in the
courts," but faces potential penalties of up to $25,000 per day
for failure to comply.'"
words "and welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988).
5. Under CERCLA, for example, administrative orders issued pursuant to § 104
and § 106 are expressly precluded from review by § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)
(1988). See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text. Similarly, provisions of the
Clean Air Act explicitly preclude review. See infra notes 127-65 and accompanying
text. As will be explained, review of these orders is ultimately available when EPA
seeks to enforce an order in the courts.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980), as amended by
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
7. CAA § 307(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(e) (1988). See infra notes 127-65 and accom-
panying text.
8. Pre-enforcement review, undefined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990),
is judicial review of administrative orders prior to the agency's attempt to enforce the
order or take action under the order. See Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777
F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985). In the context of CERCLA, pre-enforcement review has been
defined as "judicial review of EPA actions prior to the time that the EPA or a third
party undertakes a legal action to enforce an order or seek a recovery of costs for the
cleanup of a hazardous waste site." Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289
(6th Cir. 1991)(quoting Reardon v. United States, 922 F.2d 28, 30, n. 4 (1st Cir.
1990)).
9. See infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. EPA may also assess treble fines for failure to comply with an administrative
3
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The primary reason offered for CERCLA's bar to pre-en-
forcement review of administrative orders is that under many
circumstances pre-enforcement review would delay the EPA's
response to environmental emergencies and waste the agency's
scarce time and resources on litigation."3 Review of adminis-
trative orders has been found to frustrate the purpose of the
act - to rapidly abate environmental hazards posed by toxic
substances. ' Prior to 1986, CERCLA was silent as to whether
review of administrative orders was available, but the majority
of the courts considering the issue found that the statute im-
plicitly barred review.' 5 In 1986, Congress codified the judi-
cially created bar to judicial review in the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).'"
Unfortunately, Congress has left other federal environ-
mental statutes silent as to whether pre-enforcement review is
precluded,' 7 leaving the recipients of administrative orders in
doubt as to whether to challenge the validity of the order in
court. Because of Congress' silence, courts are left to guess
Congress' intent, searching for hints in the statutes' language,
legislative histories, and purposes.' 8
When administrative orders are issued to address emer-
gency hazards to human health or the environment, the poli-
cies supporting a bar to pre-enforcement review are overrid-
ing. "'9 However, when environmental statutes are silent as to
order, increasing the penalty to up to $75,000 per day per violation. CERCLA §
107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988).
13. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
14. Id. See also Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986); Ami-
noil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984)("Allowing an alleged responsible
party to challenge the merits of the § 106(a) administrative order prior to an enforce-
ment or recovery action would handcuff the [EPA] by delaying effective responses to
emergency situations.") Id. at 73).
15. See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
16. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The SARA amendments added §
113(h) which expressly bars review of § 104 and § 106(a) orders. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)
(1988). See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
17. Neither the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922(k) (1988) nor the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1988) expressly provide for, or preclude, pre-enforcement review.
18. See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 81-82, 95-106, 145-155, 179-180 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9
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pre-enforcement review, a challenge to an administrative or-
der may force EPA to litigate the validity of the order. As a
result, little or no response actions take place to abate the en-
vironmental hazard, litigation expenses mount, and the re-
sources of the EPA and the judiciary are wasted.
The sensitive nature of environmental hazards and the
costs of litigation are such that Congress must clearly estab-
lish whether administrative orders under the federal environ-
mental statutes are reviewable. 20 Otherwise, the EPA and re-
sponsible parties will waste their time, efforts, and resources
in litigation rather than using those resources to abate the en-
vironmental hazard.
This paper will set forth the factors the courts have used
to analyze whether pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders is barred, and will apply those factors to issues of pre-
enforcement review of administrative orders that have not
reached the courts. Finally, this paper will discuss the appro-
priateness of a legislative prohibition on pre-enforcement re-
view of administrative orders under the major federal environ-
mental statutes.2
II. Sources of Judicial Review
Petitions for review of administrative orders usually seek
to invoke jurisdiction under: the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 2 the enabling statute itself (the environmental
20. When pollution to the environment poses a hazard of impending significant
damage, immediate action by either the EPA or the recipient of the order is required.
See, e.g., CERCLA §§ 104(a), 106(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a) (1988). Immediate
remedial action prevents further contamination that could require more complex and
expensive remediation efforts. The longer environmental hazards remain, the greater
the possibility of migration of pollutants into surface or groundwater, air, or soil.
Greater migration of pollutants into environmental media complicates cleanup be-
cause it requires that remedial efforts be taken upon a greater volume of the environ-
mental media, involving additional time and resources.
21. RCRA, CWA and CAA were chosen because they represent the permitting
programs for the three major environmental media: land, water, and air. CERCLA
serves as a model for discussion because the statute was originally silent as to pre-
enforcement review and, after the courts decided pre-enforcement review would be
barred, Congress enacted CERCLA § 113(h) which expressly precluded review of
many CERCLA administrative orders. See infra notes 86-126 and accompanying text.
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988). However, the APA is not an independent source
1992]
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statute, for the purposes of this discussion), one of the general
jurisdictional statutes granting review of federal questions,23
such as actions arising out of the regulation of commerce240r
actions arising from a government official's deprivation of con-
stitutional rights.25 Suit may be commenced in the federal dis-
trict courts or the courts of appeals, depending on the juris-
dictional provisions of the enabling statute.
Most courts have held that constitutional questions are
always reviewable, regardless of the provisions of the APA or
the enabling statute.2" For example, if the recipient of an or-
der seeks to review whether a statutory scheme abrogates con-
stitutional rights, the courts may consider the question even if
review is expressly precluded by the statute.27
III. The Administrative Procedure Act
Judicial review of agency actions are governed by the
APA, in addition to any review explicitly provided for in the
enabling statute.28 The APA, however, is not an independent
of judicial review. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (granting jurisdiction over all federal questions aris-
ing under the "Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Parties may also claim jurisdiction under the Declar-
atory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988). Cost Control Mktg. and Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Pierce, 848 F.2d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 1988) (the Declaratory Judgment Act
may not be used to circumvent statutory procedural methods, however).
26. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988).
27. For the federal environmental statutes, constitutional challenges under the
due process clause of the Constitution are most common. See Reardon v. United
States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (reviewing constitutionality of CERCLA lien,
and holding lien violative of due process for failure to provide for notice and
predeprivation hearing, but denying pre-enforcement review of validity of CERCLA
lien and applicability of statutory defenses due to express statutory bar); Aminoil,
Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 72 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (reviewing constitutionality of CER-
CLA statutory scheme, but denying pre-enforcement review of merits of administra-
tive order); SCA Serv. of Indiana, Inc. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (same). But see Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991)
(CERCLA provision barring pre-enforcement judicial review applies to bar constitu-
tional challenges); South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 681 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (same); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J.
1985) (no subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional challenge), aff'd 777 F.2d 882
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
28. See generally WILLIAM F. Fox. JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/9
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source of judicial review."' Rather, its provisions define judi-
cial jurisdiction or a cause of action upon which jurisdiction
created by other statutes may be invoked.30
Review of administrative orders presumably would be
available under two of the APA's provisions. Section 704 of
the APA provides specifically for review of final agency action
"for which there is no adequate remedy in a court .... " Sec-
tion 702 states that a "person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency ac-
tion .. .is entitled to judicial review thereof. '32
The plain meaning of these provisions would apparently
provide for review of a broad range of disputes with agency
actions. In the case of administrative orders requiring a re-
sponsible party to abate an environmental hazard, certainly
the party is adversely affected by agency action so as to in-
voke the APA judicial review provisions. However, section 701
of the APA exempts certain agency actions from review. Sec-
tion 701(a) states that judicial review under the APA applies
except "to the extent that: (1) statutes preclude judicial re-
view; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion
by law." 33
Of the statutes to be discussed authorizing issuance of ad-
ministrative orders to abate environmental hazards, only
CERCLA clearly falls under the first exception by explicitly
precluding pre-enforcement review. CERCLA expressly pre-
cludes review through a statutory provision barring pre-en-
forcement review of administrative orders.34 The Clean Air
Act (CAA) 35 contains a broad prohibition to judicial review
(1986).
29. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
30. Id. In some rare situations the courts may invoke the jurisprudential doctrine
of nonstatutory review to decide cases. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444
(1988) (listing cases in which nonstatutory review of agency action for personnel dis-
putes under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was attempted).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (emphasis added).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988).
34. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). See, e.g., Dickerson v. EPA,
834 F.2d 974 (llth Cir. 1987).
35. CAA §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
19921
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where review has not been provided for in other sections of
the statute." Other environmental statutes that are the focus
of this discussion, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) 37 and the Clean Water Act (CWA),3 8 do not con-
tain provisions explicitly addressing pre-enforcement review
of administrative orders.39
The second exception from judicial review under the
APA, the exception for action committed to agency discretion,
is probably not applicable to the administrative orders to be
discussed.4 0 The Supreme Court has deemed the exception for
actions committed to agency discretion "a very narrow excep-
tion""' and has applied the exception only in rare
circumstances.' 2
36. CAA § 307(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(e) (1988). See infra notes 128-67 and accom-
panying text. The Clean Air Act also boldly proclaims under the subsection governing
review of rulemaking, that the APA "shall not, except as expressly provided in [sec-
tion 307(d)], apply to actions to which this subsection applies." CAA § 307(d), 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The validity of such a broad exclusion of
agency action from the APA has not been addressed by the courts.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
38. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
39. See infra notes 166-230 and accompanying text.
40. No courts have applied the "committed to agency action" exception to ad-
ministrative orders issued under the environmental statutes.
41. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the
Supreme Court stated that the exception for action committed to agency discretion
was "a very narrow exception." Id. at 408. The Court indicated that "review is not to
be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would not have a meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Id. at 410. The Court cited
the legislative history of the APA and stated that the exception for actions commit-
ted to agency discretion applies only in those "rare instances where 'statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'" Id. (citing
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)).
42. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (held that the Food and,
Drug Administration's (FDA) decision not to require drugs used in lethal injection of
prisoners on death row to be "safe and effective" for execution was committed to
agency discretion by law and was therefore not reviewable).
Some factors which might be determinative of whether an action is committed to
agency discretion by law are: (1) the degree of agency discretion which already exists,
(2) the expertise and experience necessary to understand the subject matter, (3) the
appropriateness of judicial intervention and the ability of a court to ensure correct
results (4) the agencies need for informality and speed in decision-making, and (5)
whether other controls on agency discretion exist. See generally Harvey Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82
HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/9
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Statutory preclusion of judicial review need not be ex-
press, but may be implied from statutory language and legis-
lative history. 43 In the absence of an express statutory provi-
sion barring review, the United States Supreme Court has
established a number of criteria that are generally applicable
to all statutes to determine whether review is proper. As the
Supreme Court stated in Block v. Community Nutrition In-
stitute, "[w]hether and to what extent a particular statute
precludes judicial review is determined not only from its ex-
press language, but also from the structure of the statutory
scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of
the administrative action involved."
4 4
The first place to look to determine whether review of ad-
ministrative orders is precluded is the enabling statute itself.4 1
Statutes often state their purpose and intent. Many of the en-
vironmental statutes have extensive legislative histories that
may be consulted to determine what Congress had in mind.
Most environmental statutes have congressional findings and
declarations of purpose that may be helpful in determining
congressional intent.46
The courts will also look to what procedures are afforded
by the statute in the absence of judicial review to determine
whether a bar to pre-enforcement review is appropriate.'7
The agency actions which are most clearly committed to agency action by law are
decisions not to take requested enforcement action. The decision not to enforce has
traditionally been relegated to prosecutorial discretion and is presumptively unre-
viewable. See Heckler, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
43. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). The standards for
whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of statutory claims and consti-
tutional claims should not be confused. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
"where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent
to do so must be clear." Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S: 592 (1988). See also Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
44. Block, 467 U.S. at 345.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., CAA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); CWA § 101, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); TSCA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988); RCRA §§ 1002, 1003, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6902 (1988).
47. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 415 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Mo.
1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977) (interpreting judicial review of the Clean Air
Act).
1992]
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Under many of the major environmental statutes, the EPA
must bring an action in court to enforce the administrative
order. 8 The courts can review the validity of the order at that
time. Any excessive penalty assessments can be reduced by
invoking the equitable powers of the courts. "9 Courts address-
ing the issue have often indicated that these types of proce-
dures provided for in the statute may substitute for pre-en-
forcement review. 0
When statutes are silent as to judicial review of adminis-
trative orders, the absence of a provision specifically affording
review is not clear and convincing evidence of an intent to
withhold review.5 1 However, as the Court held in Block, the
structure of the statute will give clues as to whether Congress
intended to preclude review.2 For example, the fact that re-
view is explicitly provided for one class of persons affected by
an administrative order may be "strong evidence" that Con-
gress intended to preclude the other class from obtaining judi-
cial review.53 Similarly, when two different provisions of the
same statute are precisely drawn, the express inclusion of ju-
dicial review in one provision will provide "persuasive evi-
dence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further
review" of the other provision. 4
Case law has recognized a general presumption in favor of
judicial review,"5 unless there is "clear and convincing evi-
dence of a contrary legislative intent" to restrict access to ju-
dicial review.56 The presumption "may be overcome by spe-
48. See, e.g., CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988); CAA §§ 113, 303, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7603 (Supp. 11 1990).
49. Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d at 891 (suggesting that the doctrine of laches may be
invoked if the EPA fails to promptly seek enforcement).
50. See infra notes 118-26, 156-65, 177-80 and accompanying text.
51. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In-
terpreting § 701 of the APA the court stated, " '[tihe mere failure to provide specifi-
cally by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold re-
view.'" Id. at 402-03. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1945)).
52. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984).
53. Id. at 345-48.
54. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982).
55. Block, 467 U.S. 340 (1984). See also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
56. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). See also Citizens to Pre-
[Vol. 9
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cific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable
indicator of congressional intent. 57 The Supreme Court has
indicated that the presumption favoring judicial review is not
to be applied in the "strict evidentiary sense '5' but may be
overcome whenever the congressional intent to preclude is
"fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."59
Additionally, the courts have long recognized a require-
ment of finality of agency action before cases will be heard.
Section 704 of the APA provides that only final agency actions
are reviewable6 0 This finality requirement is important in the
case of administrative orders because, as will be seen, the
EPA has successfully prevented pre-enforcement review by
arguing that its administrative actions are not final.0 ' When
administrative procedures are not yet exhausted, the courts
cannot hear the action.62 Exceptions to the exhaustion re-
quirement may arise in the case of constitutional questions,6"
and when irreparable injury"' or statutory or constitutional vi-
olations will result.6 5
Several factors are relevant to the inquiry of whether
agency action is final. Final agency action should represent
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ("To preclude judicial review under
this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide
specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold
review." Id. at 156-57 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1945));
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988); Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly,
889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989) (precluding judicial review in a CERCLA § 104 order).
57. Block, 467 U.S. at 349.
58. Id. at 350.
59. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 157 (1970).
See also Block, 467 U.S. at 351; United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
61. See infra notes 125-27, 144, 164-65, 181-85, 204-10 and accompanying text.
62. Bell v. New Jersey & Pennsylvania, 461 U.S. 773, 779-780 (1983)(focusing on
whether review will disrupt the administrative agency process); Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
63. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 486 (1971).
64. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
65. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290,
293 (3d Cir. 1982).
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the final and definitive legal position of the agency, should
have a practical and immediate impact upon the daily opera-
tions of the affected interest, and review should foster agency
and judicial efficiency. 6
Strong policy implications support the finality and ex-
haustion requirements. The finality and exhaustion require-
ments avoid interruption of agency activities, respect the au-
tonomy of administrative agencies, and allow the agency to
develop the necessary factual background, apply its expertise,
and crystallize its position. 7 Furthermore, the finality and ex-
haustion requirements promote conservation of judicial re-
sources because if the complaining party successfully vindi-
cates his rights at the agency level, the courts may never have
to intervene.6 8
If agency action is final and the statute does not preclude
review, an action must be ripe in order to be reviewed by the
courts. 9 Ripeness is required to prevent the courts from inter-
fering with abstract administrative policy-making prior to an
agency's development of its legal position.7" In determining
whether a pre-enforcement agency action is ripe, courts must
consider the "fitness of the issue for judicial decision, and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. ' 71
As will be discussed, pre-enforcement review of administrative
66. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239-243 (1980). See also Solar Tur-
bines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1080 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying finality and exhaus-
tion to EPA action under the Clean Air Act).
67. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969).
68. Christian v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 414 U.S. 614, 622 (1974).
69. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967).
70. Id.
71. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1986), the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held that a letter issued by EPA
constituted final agency action and imposed sufficient hardship on the recipient to
warrant review. Id. at 437. In that case, compliance with the terms of the letter would
have resulted in a 50% loss in sales of the pesticide at issue. Id. at 432. The court
found that judicial review would not disrupt the orderly process of administrative
decision-making, or threaten health or safety. Id. at 437-438. The court quoted Inde-
pendent Bankers Assoc. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 929 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862 (1976), for the proposition that "an agency's interpretation of its governing stat-
ute, with the expectation that regulated parties will conform to and rely on this inter-
pretation, is final agency action fit for judicial review." Id. at 438.
[Vol. 9
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/9
PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
orders has been denied based on finality, exhaustion, and
ripeness.72
IV. Pre-enforcement Review Case Law in the Federal
Environmental Statutes
The question of whether administrative orders are re-
viewable is an important one. Judicial review of administra-
tive orders is an important safeguard against arbitrary action
by the agency.73 If review is available, private parties may be
protected from significant potential civil penalties and intru-
sive actions such as groundwater monitoring or remediation. 4
Since most statutory penalties accrue each day violations oc-
cur, the civil penalties for failure or refusal to comply with an
administrative order to abate environmental hazards can
quickly become enormous.7 The potential financial liability
can force responsible parties to consent to EPA orders rather
than risk an unfavorable outcome after prolonged litigation.76
Furthermore, if the order is subject to review, the alleged
violator may be able to persuade the court to allow a lesser
degree of pollution abatement, representing considerable sav-
ings in cleanup costs. 77 The court always has the option of in-
validating the order altogether.78 Often, the scientific data is
conflicting and is almost always subject to differing interpre-
72. See infra notes 110-11,
73. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, The Su-
preme Court, And The Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819
(1988).
74. See, e.g., Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (barring pre-
enforcement review of CERCLA § 106(a) order, but enjoining EPA's assessment of
civil penalties under § 106(b)).
75. The penalties for violation of EPA imminent and substantial endangerment
orders under CERCLA § 106(b) can be up to $25,000 per day per violation. CERCLA
§ 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1988). Both RCRA and the CAA imminent hazard
provisions provide for penalties of not more than $5000 per day for failure to comply
with administrative orders. RCRA § 7003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(b) (1988); CAA § 303,
42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. II 1990).
76. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1982).
77. See Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1498-99 (D.N.J.
1985)(objection to cleanup method may be brought up in the cost recovery action),
777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
78. See infra notes 119-23, 159-60 and accompanying text.
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tations. Disputes as to the level of contaminants on site, the
method of removal and remediation, and the level of cleanup
required, arise and can significantly affect cleanup costs. 9 As
a result, the costs of undertaking removal and remedial action
in a particular situation could vary dramatically depending on
the assessment of the site. Often companies feel that removal
and remedial action would be cheaper if they chose their own
contractors rather than use those chosen by the EPA.
On the other hand, allowing pre-enforcement review will
inevitably result in delay which could frustrate the quick re-
sponse required to prevent environmental damage. In many
situations, even the slightest postponement in cleaning up a
site can dramatically increase the risk of harm to health or the
environment.80 Under these types of circumstances, the Su-
preme Court created bar to pre-enforcement review of admin-
istrative orders in emergency situations applies. The Supreme
Court has long recognized an exception to allowing review of
administrative orders issued in emergency situations.8 1 In
emergency situations, rapid administrative action is justified
by the need to protect the public health and safety.2
Whether these statutes, which are silent as to review, pre-
clude pre-enforcement review under section 701(a) of the APA
will depend upon factors set forth by the Supreme Court: (1)
the structure of the statutory scheme; (2) the statute's objec-
tives; (3) legislative history; and (4) the nature of the adminis-
79. Selection of the proper design and technology for cleanup of a hazardous
waste site, for example, is dependent upon a number of different factors. See, e.g.,
MARK HANEY & JANE CASLER, RCRA HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO PERMITTING, COMPLI-
ANCE, CLOSURE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RE-
COVERY ACT 94-104 (3d ed. 1990)(available from ENSR Consulting and Engineering).
80. See Sharon M. Murphy, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the
Pollution Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies:
The Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 178-179 (1992).
81. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 299-300
(1981) (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677-80
(1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Ewing v. Mytinger & Cas-
selberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54
(1947); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-43 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-99 (1931);
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-21 (1908).
82. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 301.
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trative action involved. 3 The structure, objectives, and legis-
lative history of each statutory scheme differ, requiring each
environmental statute to be analyzed separately.84 In addition,
many courts have considered the principles of finality, ex-
haustion, and ripeness in determining whether to review an
administrative order. 5
A. Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders Under
CERCLA
As a result of congressional concern with the disposal of
wastes before RCRA's regulatory scheme took effect, Congress
passed CERCLA to provide resources to clean up hazardous
waste sites as rapidly as possible. 6 CERCLA was enacted to
fill gaps in RCRA and to insure clean up of thousands of dor-
mant sites and alleviate problems locating financially respon-
sible owners of hazardous waste dumps.8 7 Part of the reason
for the apparent overlap of the statutes is that at the time
CERCLA was written, the EPA interpreted RCRA as apply-
ing only to active RCRA regulated facilities.88 In order to
avoid lengthy and uncertain legal battles over section 7003,89
Congress passed CERCLA, with its sections 104 and 106,
which apply retroactively to clean up facilities where hazard-
ous substances were disposed of in the past, even prior to the
statute's enactment in 1980.0 Thus, CERCLA empowers the
EPA to issue orders to abate hazards at both active and aban-
doned facilities.9'
CERCLA is a remedial statute, focusing on cleanup of fa-
83. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984).
84. Because the statutes to be discussed are silent as to pre-enforcement review,
the legislative history is ambiguous at best.
85. See infra notes 125-27, 144, 164-65, 181-86, 205-11 and accompanying text.
86. S, REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980).
87. See HR. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
88. See 43 Fed. Reg. 58,984 (1978).
89. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980).
90. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (hereinaf-
ter NEPACCO).
91. CERCLA §§ 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1988).
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cilities where hazardous substances come to be found rather
than regulating the treatment, storage, and disposal of haz-
ardous wastes as does RCRA. Under section 106(a), the EPA
can either issue orders requiring the recipient to clean up an
"imminent and substantial endangerment," or sue in federal
district court for an injunction to compel clean up 2 and assess
civil penalties." The advantage of using section 106 rather
than EPA commencing removal and remedial action under
section 104 is that through section 106(a) orders, the site may
be cleaned up without depleting the Superfund, and EPA
time and resources are not wasted on a suit against the re-
sponsible party for reimbursement. A commonly perceived
difficulty in using section 106(a) is that the EPA must estab-
lish that there "may be" an "imminent and substantial
endangerment."9 4
Even prior to Congress' explicit bar to pre-enforcement
review enacted in the 1986 amendments, " the courts almost
unanimously held that pre-enforcement review of CERCLA
section 106(a) orders was impliedly prohibited.96 The ration-
92. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v.
Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 94 (D. Conn. 1988); United States v. A & F Materials, 578
F. Supp. 1249, 1257-58 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1113 (D.N.J. 1983).
93. CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1988).
94. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich, 697 F. Supp. at 96-97 (D. Conn. 1988). Analysis of
the case law demonstrates that the burden of establishing an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment under CERCLA § 106(a) is not great. It has been found that the
words "may be" indicate a congressional intent to allow injunctive relief before an
endangerment arises. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir.
1984). An endangerment has been considered imminent if factors giving rise to it are
present, even though the harm may not be realized for years. United States v. Con-
servation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 193-94 (D. Mo. 1985). An endangerment is
"substantial" if there is a reasonable cause for concern that someone or something
may be exposed to a risk of harm by a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance. Id. at 194. The quantity of hazardous material and the nature of the mate-
rial may be determinative of the issue. Id. However, a minimal amount of hazardous
material may still deem an endangerment to be "substantial." NEPACCO, 579 F.
Supp. 823, 832 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
95. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
96. Judicial review has been barred by nearly every court addressing the issue.
Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986);'Wheaton Indus. v. United
States, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 23 Env't Rep.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/9
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ale for denying review was that the emergency nature of sec-
tion 106(a) orders is such that judicial review could delay ef-
fective response action. 7 Courts found that the legislative
history indicated that Congress intended for section 106(a) or-
ders, as well as section 104 removal and remedial actions, to
be barred from review."
Rapid response actions are important in the CERCLA
scheme to prevent irreparable harm to persons or the environ-
ment.9 In Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA,' 0 the District Court for the
Central District of California found that "[a]llowing an al-
leged responsible party to challenge the merits of the section
106(a) administrative order prior to an enforcement or recov-
ery action would handcuff the EPA by delaying effective re-
Cas. (BNA) 1758 (W.D. Mo. 1985), afJ'd 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987); Pollution Con-
trol Indus. of America, Inc. v. Reilly, 715 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (no review of
EPA decision against use of particular contractor for cleanup); United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chem. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1757 (D. Minn. 1985); Wagner
Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985); Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F.
Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Earthline Co. v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2161 (D.N.J. 1984).
97. See, e.g., Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (allowing a challenge to
the section 106 administrative order would delay effective response to emergency sit-
uations). In the context of § 104 orders, see Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777
F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) ("The statutory
approach to the problem of hazardous waste is inconsistent with the delay that would
accompany pre-enforcement review. . . . [W]e find in [§ 104] an implicit disapproval
of pre-enforcement judicial review." Id. at 886-87.).
98. "[Elmergency action will often be required prior to the receipt of evidence
which conclusively establishes an emergency. Because delay will often exacerbate an
already serious situation, the bill authorizes the Administrator to take action when an
imminent and substantial endangerment may exist." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d. Sess., Pt. 1, 28 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6131. See Aminoil,
599 F. Supp. at 73 (the structure of the statute is such that Congress did not intend
to allow judicial review of § 106(a) orders prior to the commencement of either an
enforcement action under § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b), or a cost recovery action
under § 107 (c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3)) (1988). See also Eureka v. United States,
770 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mo. 1991)(denying review of remedial actions taken by EPA).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, 28 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6131. If chemical spills or leaking drums can be rapidly cle-
aned up, costly contamination of ground and surface waters can be prevented. Once
hazardous substances have reached underground aquifers, cleanup costs are signifi-
cantly increased. If hazardous substances have already contaminated aquifers or
water bodies, rapid action is required to prevent further contamination and prevent
persons from using the water.
100. 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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sponses to emergency situations.'"10 1 Similarly, in Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett,-°2 the Second Circuit stated that:
Congress envisioned a procedure that permits the EPA to
move expeditiously in the face of a potential environmen-
tal disaster. To introduce the delay of court proceedings
at the outset of a cleanup would conflict with the strong
congressional policy that directs cleanups to occur prior
to a final determination of the party's rights and liabili-
ties . 103
Indeed, the courts have barred other CERCLA provisions
from review in accordance with CERCLA's underlying pur-
pose, most notably EPA response actions under section
104(a).104 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated,
"pre-enforcement review of EPA's remedial actions . . . [is]
contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA."' 5 Thus, the
delay caused by judicial review of agency action overrides an
alleged violator's right to judicial review. 0 '
In 1986, Congress codified the prohibition on pre-enforce-
ment review of administrative orders in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).0 7
101. Id. at 71.
102. 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 315.
104. See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). See also Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974 (11th Cir.
1987); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986).
105. Wagner Seed Co., 800 F.2d at 315. See also Reardon v. United States, 947
F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991)(noting that clean up of hazardous substances that
endanger public health would be delayed if EPA were forced to litigate each detail of
its removal and remedial plans before implementing them).
106. See Lone Pine Steering Comm., 777 F.2d at 884 (Congress intended to em-
power the EPA to take "prompt action without the delays associated with litigation."
Once EPA initiated suit under § 107 for recovery of costs effective review could be
had. Id.). See also B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290 (D.
Utah 1986); Jefferson County v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Mo. 1986);
Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71-72 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
107. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986). The enactment of §
113(h) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) codi-
fied the judicially created bar to preenforcement review and allowed preenforcement
review of CERCLA orders under only 5 specific limited circumstances: (1) in actions
under § 107 to recover response costs, or damages for contribution; (2) in actions
[Vol. 9
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SARA amended CERCLA by removing section 104 and sec-
tion 106 administrative orders from the purview of the
courts.108 Exceptions are for suits brought by the EPA to re-
cover costs of remedial action, enforce an order issued under
section 106, or in suits by the recipient of the order to recover
costs under section 106(b)(2). °0
brought by the EPA to enforce § 106(a) orders; (3) in actions for reimbursement for
fines levied pursuant to § 106(a), as provided for in § 106(b)(2); (4) in citizen suit
actions under § 310 alleging that a remedial action taken does not meet the require-
ments of CERCLA; or (5) in actions under § 106 by the EPA to compel remedial
action. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). See, e.g., 'Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v.
Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Additionally, the fact that section 113 of
SARA was designed 'to confirm ... and build ... upon existing case law," supports
the view that "this is a situation in which Congress intended to withhold judicial
review." Id. at 1389, quoting 132 CONG. REC. S14,928 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (State-
ment of Senator Thurmond, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee that drafted
SARA's judicial review provision)); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir.
1990)("The jurisdictional bar in SARA merely codified the established rule that pre-
implementation review of response actions would not be allowed .... "), cert. denied
sub nom. Frey v. Reilly, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990), reh'g denied 111 S. Ct. 802 (1991).
108. CERCLA § 113(h)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(3) (1988) reads as follows:
No federal court shall have jurisdiction . . . to review any challenges to re-
moval or remedial action selected under section [§ 104], or to review any
order issued under section [§ 106(a)], in any action except one of the
following:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response
costs or damages or for contribution.
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of this
title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order.
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this
title.
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens
suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under sec-
tion 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was
in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may
not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to
be undertaken at the site.
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title which the United States
has moved to compel a remedial action.
Id.
109. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). See also Browning-Ferris
Indus. of South Jersey, Inc. v. Muszynski, No. 89-CIV-1929-LLS (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Pollution Control Indus. of Am., Inc. v. Reilly, Civ. No. 89-C-4036, 18 Chem. Waste
Lit. Rptr. 550 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
The bar to pre-enforcement review has not prevented courts from allowing EPA
and private parties to obtain declaratory judgments of liability for past and future
response costs prior to filing cost recovery suits. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.,
19
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An additional factor in denying pre-enforcement review
of EPA enforcement activities is the practical consideration
that information courts need to decide challenges to agency
actions may not be available at the point when pre-enforce-
ment review is sought.11 ° One of the purposes of the bar to
pre-enforcement review of CERCLA section 113(h) is to "de-
lay review until enough is known to decide these issues. '
CERCLA's bar to pre-enforcement review has been con-
strued broadly. In Reardon v. United States, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals refused pre-enforcement review of a lien
placed upon a piece of property for the recovery of costs of
clean up of hazardous substances on the site by EPA." 2 The
court found that the placement of the lien on the property
was an enforcement activity that came under the guise of "re-
moval" or "remedial" action as those terms are defined in the
statute, 3 and therefore the challenge to a removal or reme-
dial action was explicitly barred from pre-enforcement review
under section 113(h) of the statute. 1 4 Thus, under Reardon's
broad reading of the definition of removal or remedial action,
a great number of CERCLA enforcement activities are barred
from pre-enforcement review." 5
Section 113(h) of CERCLA bars pre-enforcement review
even in the face of irreparable harm, which has been tradi-
tionally construed as an exception to the finality and exhaus-
tion requirements under the APA."10 In Boarhead v. Erickson,
889 F.2d 1380, 1387 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1989); Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
110. Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1513.
111. Id. at 1513. The argument that review must be delayed until EPA possesses
enough information about a facility is akin to denying review based on the ripeness
doctrine. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
112. 947 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc). Liens such as the one in this
case are filed pursuant to explicit federal lien authority in CERCLA § 107(1), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988).
113. See CERCLA §§ 101(23),(24), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23),(24) (1988).
114. Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1512, 1514. See also Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1073
(3d Cir. 1989) (challenge to remedial plan barred by section 113(h)).
115. Note, however, that bankruptcy proceedings concerning CERCLA sites do
not constitute pre-enforcement review barred by CERCLA. In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d 997, 1005-06 (2d Cir. 1991).
116. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
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the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held Congress had
determined that the potential for irreparable harm to archeo-
logical or historical resources was outweighed by the public
interest in removing hazardous wastes from Superfund
sites. "'
The language of section 113(h) of CERCLA indicates that
it does not totally bar review, but merely delays review until
enforcement actions are brought by EPA."' Therefore, argu-
ments that a prohibition on judicial review gives the EPA un-
fettered discretion, in violation of the due process clause, " 9
are rebutted by the fact that review of the validity of an order
is always available when the EPA brings an enforcement ac-
tion to recover penalties'20 or sues to recover costs.'' How-
ever, as a practical matter review may be denied altogether if
EPA never brings an enforcement action.'
The courts have addressed this issue in a variety of ways.
117. 923 F.2d 1011, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).
118. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). The section is appropri-
ately entitled "Timing of review."
The fact that a suit was dismissed under section 113(h) does not preclude a party
from filing after an enforcement action is taken. Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d
918, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
119. U.S. CONST., amend. V, XIV.
120. If the recipient of an administrative order refuses to comply with that order,
the EPA must seek to enforce the order in district court. Lone Pine Steering Comm.
v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). Persons fail-
ing to comply may be liable for up to $25,000 per day" per penalty, as well as treble
punitive damages in some cases. CERCLA §§ 106(b), 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b),
9607(c)(3) (1988).
121. Under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988), the EPA
may recover all costs "not inconsistent with" the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
The NCP was revised at 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394 (1988) and is found at 40 C.F.R. § 300
(1991). Cleanup by the EPA under § 104 must meet the consistency with the NCP
requirement more rigidly than § 106(a) cleanups by responsible parties. Section
106(a) actions are subject to the "not inconsistent with" the NCP criteria with a few
exceptions. See 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1991). Under CERCLA § 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)
(1988), cleanup standards for § 106(a) must be in accordance with the NCP to the
extent practicable, and must take into account the cost effectiveness of the response.
40 C.F.R. § 300.415(j) and § 300.65(h) (1991) exempt § 106 actions from many of the
requirements of § 104 removal and remedial actions. For example, § 106(a) removal
actions must meet NCP standards to the "extent practicable considering the exigen-
cies of the situation." 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(i) (1991).
122. See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1515 n.1 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Courts have held that CERCLA administrative orders do not
affect property interests until a suit for reimbursement is
filed, and therefore due process is not implicated.2 3 Other
courts have found that the issuance of administrative orders
under CERCLA is not "final agency action" within the mean-
ing of section 704 of the APA'2 4 because it is up to EPA's
discretion whether to enforce the order or not.' 6 Thus, ac-
tions seeking to review the merits of an order prior to an at-
tempt by the EPA to enforce it are not ripe for review under
the APA.' 26
B. Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders Under
the Clean Air Act
Administrative orders for the enforcement of the CAA
may be issued under section 113 and section 303.121 Section
113(a) authorizes EPA to issue orders requiring a source to
comply with state implementation plans (SIPs),'2 8 requiring
states with permit programs to enforce the provisions of the
CAA,'2 9 or requiring compliance with any other violation of
the CAA.136 Under section 113(a), EPA may issue administra-
tive pollution abatement orders after notifying the responsible
123. Lone Pine Steering Comm., 777 F.2d at 887.
In Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987), the recipient of
a CERCLA § 106(a) order argued that its property interests were affected by the
order because it would have to carry the potential liability for treble punitive dam-
ages on its financial statements. Id. at 389. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that due process was not violated because treble damages would not
be assessed if it was found that the party opposing an administrative order had rea-
sonable grounds for challenging the order. Id. at 390.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
125. Earthline v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 21 Env. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2161 (Apr. 13, 1984).
126. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985).
127. CAA §§ 113, 303, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7603 (Supp. II 1990). CAA administra-
tive orders are generally an alternative to civil judicial action. Id.
128. CAA § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990). EPA must first
issue a notice of violation 30 days prior to the issuance of an administrative order to
comply with a SIP requirement. Id.
129. CAA § 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (Supp. II 1990). This provisign ap-
plies when the EPA "finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan ...
are so widespread that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State ...
to enforce the plan .... " Id.
130. CAA § 113(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (Supp. II 1990).
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party of a violation and giving the violator thirty days to com-
ply with the order's requirements. 131 The order does not take
effect until the responsible party has had an opportunity to
confer with EPA."3 2 EPA also has the option of bringing a
civil action in the district in which the violation occurred.'33
Failure to comply with section 113(a) administrative orders
can result in fines of up to $25,000 per day per violation, and/
or imprisonment of up to one year."" Section 113, like section
303, is silent as to whether pre-enforcement review is
available.
Section 303 authorizes EPA to bring suit in district court
to restrain persons contributing to pollution presenting an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to public health. 35
If suit "is not practicable to assure prompt protection of pub-
lic health or welfare," EPA may issue "orders as may be nec-
essary to protect public health or welfare or the
environment. "36
The timing and procedures for judicial review of agency
actions under the CAA are set, forth in section 307 of the
Act. 137 That section does not explicitly provide for review of
administrative orders issued under sections 113 and 303 of the
CAA.' -3 Section 307(e) provides that "[n]othing in this chap-
ter shall be construed to authorize judicial review of regula-
131. CAA § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
132. CAA § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
133. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. II 1990).
134. CAA § 113(b),(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b),(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
135. CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. II 1990).
136. Id.
137. CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
138. In addition to providing for review of "final agency action," CAA § 307(b),
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (Supp. II 1990), section 307 explicitly provides for judicial review
of EPA action in promulgating any national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
under CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. II 1990); motor vehicle emission and fuel
standards issued under CAA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); aircraft
emission standards under CAA § 231, 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); rules
issued under CAA §§ 113, 119, 120, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7419, 7420 (1988 & Supp. II
1990); promulgation or approval of implementation plans pursuant to CAA §§ 110,
111, 42 U.S.C. § 7410, 7411 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); orders issued under CAA §§
111(j), 112, 119, & 120. See CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
The section also provides for review of rulemaking action by the EPA. See CAA §
307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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tions or orders of the Administrator under this chapter, ex-
cept as provided in this section.""13 By omitting a provision
for judicial review, Congress has explicitly barred pre-enforce-
ment review of emergency administrative orders issued under
section 303, and orders issued under section 113 of the CAA.
The question of whether review of section 303 orders are
barred from pre-enforcement review has not been reached by
the courts. However, unlike section 303, the question of
whether pre-enforcement review of section 113(a) orders is
available has reached the courts.
Section 307(e) has been interpreted as implicitly barring
review of all administrative actions other than those specifi-
cally spelled out in section 307.140 In Solar Turbines, Inc. v.
Seif, the Third Circuit denied pre-enforcement review of a
compliance order issued under section 113 of the CAA."" The
court relied heavily on the fact that section 307 explicitly pro-
vided for review of certain administrative orders and section
307(e) explicitly denied review for all other administrative or-
ders.1" 2 The court found that since section 307 was the sole
avenue for judicial review, it could not look elsewhere for au-
thority. 143 Furthermore, the court reasoned that issuance of a
compliance order was not final agency action because al-
though the order represented EPA's definitive position on
whether the CAA had been violated, no civil or criminal pen-
alties would result unless EPA brought an enforcement pro-
ceeding in district court.""
139. CAA § 307(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(e) (1988).
140. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (Court held that review of administrative orders issued
under § 167 was implicitly barred. "If Congress specifically designates a forum for
judicial review of administrative action, such a forum is exclusive." Id. at 356.). See
also Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989) (administrative order
issued under § 167 barred from pre-enforcement review).
141. 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989).
142. 879 F.2d at 1077 (citing Getty Oil v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973)).
143. Id. "Because the Act explicitly provides for review of certain actions and
explicitly denies review for everything else, we cannot look elsewhere for authority
[for] review." Id. at 1077.
144. Id. at 1081-88.
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Courts passing on the question of whether federal en-
forcement procedures under CAA section 113(a)(1) 45 are re-
viewable have found that Congress implicitly intended to pre-
clude review.146 In addition to the implication that pre-
enforcement review is barred due to the language of section
307 of the Act, the courts have found that the statutory
framework of the CAA would be disrupted if pre-enforcement
review of administrative orders was allowed. 47 The legislative
history of the CAA supports the conclusion that pre-enforce-
ment review of administrative orders for abatement of air pol-
lutants is precluded." 8 The legislative history of the act indi-
cates that Congress was concerned that EPA expedite
enforcement of the CAA."49 Accordingly, proponents of the
1970 amendments discussed the need for authority to issue
immediate cease-and-desist type of orders to protect public
health. 50
The Senate bill to amend the CAA in 1970 contained a
provision for judicial review of administrative pollution abate-
ment orders,' 6 ' but the House-Senate Conference Committee
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990). This provision was signifi-
cantly revised in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments without inclusion of a provi-
sion for pre-enforcement review. See CAA § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (Supp. II
1990).
146. Asbestec Constr. Serv., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1988); Union Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 839 (1979); West
Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 839
(1979); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1976).
147. Solar Turbines, 879 F.2d at 1078. See also Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d 885 (8th
Cir. 1977).
148. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 415 F. Supp. 799, 805-806 (W.D. Mo.
1976).
149. See Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d at 889. See, e.g., Asbestec, 849 F.2d at 769
(speedy action by EPA is essential to enforcement of the CAA) (citing Wagner Seed
Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1986)); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d
299, 304 (8th Cir. 1979).
150. Testimony on S. 3466, Environmental Policy Division of the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress for the Committee on Public Works,
United States Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., (1974), reprinted in A Legislative History
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 1005-1006 (Comm. Print 1974).
151. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5374; S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970)).
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specifically deleted this provision from the final version.152
The Supreme Court has indicated that such deletions are not
conclusive evidence of Congressional intent to preclude re-
view,153 but may suggest that the omitted portion was re-
jected.15 At least one court has found that removal of such a
provision "strongly suggests" that Congress intended that
these administrative orders be precluded from review, and
held that "Congress knowingly meant to and did foreclose"
review of administrative orders under section 113.15
In some respects, pre-enforcement review is inconsistent
with the method of enforcement of administrative abatement
orders under section 113. Since section 113(a) orders do not
automatically lead to enforcement actions, injury is specula-
tive and due process does not require review. 15 EPA always
has the option of bringing suit in the appropriate district
court to enforce the order and assess penalties. 1 7 If adminis-
trative orders are invalid, then the courts could invalidate
them at this time. 58 As for the regulated communities' argu-
ment that enforcement actions can be delayed to accumulate
large fines, the court could invoke its equity powers to reduce
those fines. 159
The procedures of section 113 of the CAA do not differ
significantly from the procedures that were partly responsible
for precluding pre-enforcement review under CERCLA sec-
tion 106."60 EPA has the option of issuing a compliance order
or proceeding directly to district court.' If the recipient of an
152. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5374. The Conference Committee report gave no rea-
son for deletion of the provision. Id. See Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d at 890.
153. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975).
154. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
155. Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d at 890-92.
156. Asbestec, 849 F.2d at 769 (arguing that denial of pre-enforcement review
inhibits liberty and property rights. Court denied review on due process grounds be-
cause only injury was to reputation); Union Elec. Co., 593 F.2d at 304; Fry Roofing,
554 F.2d at 891; West Penn Power, 522 F.2d at 311.
157. Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d at 891.
158. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 415 F. Supp. 799, 806-807 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
161. CAA § 113(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (Supp. II 1990).
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administrative compliance order fails to comply, EPA must
bring an action in district court to enforce the order.1 62 Sec-
tion 113(a)(4) provides the extra procedural safeguard of
guaranteed negotiation of the order with EPA. 6 '
The requirement that EPA bring an action in district
court to enforce CAA compliance orders has persuaded courts
to find that pre-enforcement review is precluded by the Act.
Because the EPA must bring an action in district court, it has
been held that CAA compliance orders do not constitute "fi-
nal" agency action."" Further, because compliance orders is-
sued under the CWA merely require compliance with laws
which a recipient was already subject to prior to the issuance
of the order, no property rights are affected and due process is
not implicated.' 5
C. Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders Under
the Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA) is silent as to whether pre-
enforcement review of administrative orders is available. Judi-
cial review of orders is explicitly provided for by section
309(b) of the Act'6 6 when EPA brings an enforcement action
or seeks to enforce a compliance order.'6 7 Under the CWA,
emergency abatement of water pollution is handled through
the district courts rather than via administrative orders.'6 "
The issue of pre-enforcement review arises most often
162. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. II 1990).
163. CAA § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1990). The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered preenforcement review of section 113(a) orders as con-
flicting with these conferences provided for in section 113. See Fry Roofing, 554 F.2d
at 890. In a typical case, EPA and the responsible party negotiate a consent decree,
but the EPA reserves its enforcement powers under the act. In 1985, the regulations
were amended to include public participation. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 65.04 & 65.05. WIL-
LIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER § 3.36 (1986).
164. General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1989); Asbestec Con-
str. Serv., Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1988).
165. Asbestec, 849 F.2d at 768.
166. Compliance orders are enforced in the district courts under CWA § 309(b),
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988).
167. Compliance orders are issued administratively under CWA § 309(a)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1988).
168. See CWA §§ 311(e), 504, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(e), 1364 (1988).
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when EPA issues an administrative compliance order under
section 309(a)(3) of the Act"6 9 and prior to any agency at-
tempt to enforce the order. 7" Civil penalties may be assessed
administratively,17 ' but are explicitly subject to pre-enforce-
ment review pursuant to section 309(g)(8) of the Act.1 72
In determining whether pre-enforcement review of com-
pliance orders is available under the Clean Water Act, courts
have focused on the language of the statute, its structure,
objectives, legislative history and the nature of the adminis-
trative action involved. 17 Under this analysis, it has been held
that the statutory scheme of the CWA provides "clear and
convincing evidence" that Congress intended to preclude pre-
enforcement review of administrative compliance orders is-
sued under the Clean Water Act."" The courts have recog-
nized that by providing a detailed mechanism for judicial re-
view of compliance orders once EPA seeks to enforce them,
Congress impliedly precluded judicial review of orders prior to
their enforcement.175
EPA cannot force recipients of orders to comply with the
Act unless an enforcement action is brought in the district
court.1 76 Thus, the recipient of an administrative compliance
order is afforded a full opportunity to oppose an order and is
entitled to review once EPA chooses to enforce the order. 77
Furthermore, because EPA has the option of issuing a compli-
169. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1988).
170. See, e.g., Hoffman Group, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990). Juris-
diction may be sought pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201, 2202 (1988), and federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988).
171. CWA § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988).
172. CWA § 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8) (1988). Notices of appeal of an
administrative penalty assessment must be filed in the appropriate court within 30
days from the date an administrative penalty order is issued. Id. Administrative pen-
alty assessments will be upheld unless they are not supported by substantial evidence
or they constitute an abuse of discretion. Id.
173. Southern Pine Assoc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir.
1990)(quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)).
174. Southern Pines Assoc., 912 F.2d at 715-16.
175. Hoffman Group, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990).
176. CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988).
177. Hoffman, 902 F.2d at 569-570.
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ance order or directly bringing an action in district court, the
recipient of a compliance order is in no worse position for
EPA's having issued a compliance order rather than immedi-
ately bringing an enforcement action.1 78
The policy rationale for precluding review of CWA com-
pliance orders is similar to that for administrative orders
under the other environmental statutes. Congress provided
the EPA with flexibility to address environmental problems
quickly, without becoming entangled in litigation.17 9 In bar-
ring pre-enforcement review, due process is not denied be-
cause no property rights are implicated until EPA seeks an
injunction or penalties in an enforcement proceeding in the
district court.180
Agency action amounting to mere assertion of jurisdiction
over an environmental issue is not final agency action and will
not be subject to pre-enforcement review under the exhaus-
tion and ripeness doctrines.181 In Deltona Corp. v. Alexan-
der '82 , the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
judicial review of a landowner's challenge to an Army Corps of
Engineers' denial of a dredge-and-fill permit was precluded. ' 3
The court found that since the Corps had not yet assessed the
property to determine jurisdiction, agency action was not fi-
nal.'84 The court determined that allowing the Corps to make
a wetland determination prior to judicial review of the action
promoted the policies supporting the exhaustion require-
ment. '85 Similarly, the issuance of a cease-and-desist order is
a mere assertion of jurisdiction, not a final agency action sub-
ject to review. '1
178. Southern Pines Assoc., 912 F.2d at 715, n. 3.
179. Southern Pines Assoc., 912 F.2d at 716.
180. Id. at 717.
181. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
182. 682 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1982):
183. Id.
184. Id. at 893.
185. Id.
186. Route 26 Land Development Ass'n v. United States, 753 F. Supp. 532, 539
(D. Del. 1990). The court found that the CWA impliedly precluded this type of re-
view. The court held that assertion of jurisdiction alone did not constitute final
agency action, relying upon the Third Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Solar Tur-
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D. Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders Under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is
silent as to whether pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders is available. EPA has broad authority to issue orders
under RCRA. For example, administrative orders may be is-
sued under section 3008(a) for compliance or civil penalties; 187
section 3008(h) for corrective action to remediate releases;' 88
section 3004(u) for corrective actions at permitted facilities;'8 9
-section 3004(v) for contamination beyond the facility bound-
ary; 9 ( and section 3013(a) for monitoring, testing, analysis or
reporting.' 9' Administrative orders for abatement of "immi-
bines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989)(holding that a Clean Air Act compli-
ance order was not a final agency action). Further, the court found that the issue
could not be ripe until the ultimate effect of the Corps assertion of jurisdiction is
known. 753 F. Supp. at 540. See also Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 22 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,359 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 1991); Mulberry Hills Dev. Co. v.
United States, 772 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (D. Md. 1991) (the CWA does not provide for
pre-enforcement review); Banks v. Page, 768 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Hampton
Venture No. One v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Va. 1991) (Corps jurisdic-
tional determination not final agency action) McGown v. United States, 747 F. Supp.
539 (E.D. Mo. 1990); United States v. Hobbs, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,830 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 1990); Fiscella & Fiscella v. United States, 717 F. Supp.
1143 (E.D. Va. 1989).
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has allowed review of
CWA compliance orders or cease-and-desist orders. In Swanson v. United States, 600
F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1985), aff'd 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of a decree that the land in question was
not a navigable water of the United States. Id. at 1370. See also Bailey v. United
States, 647 F. Supp. 44 (D. Idaho 1986).
187. RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988).
188. RCRA § 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988). According to EPA estimates,
as many as 80,000 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMU's) will be subject to cor-
rective action requirements. See EPA, "Draft Proposed Rule for RCRA Corrective
Action for SWMU's" at 16 (Dec. 11, 1987).
189. RCRA § 3004(u), 42 U.S.C § 6924(u) (1988). The most common scenario
involves corrective action pursuant to § 3004(u) as a condition of a permit issued
under § 3005. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1992).
190. RCRA § 3004(v), 42 U.S.C § 6924(v) (1988).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a) (1988). Section 3013(a) orders give the recipient thirty
days to submit a proposal to EPA for monitoring, testing, analysis or reporting.
RCRA § 3013(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6934(c) (1988).
Other provisions of RCRA grant EPA power similar to that of administrative
orders. For example, section 3007 authorizes information requests which can be en-
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nent and substantial endangerments" is addressed under sec-
tion 7003(a). 92
The judicial review section of the Act is brief and only
specifically addresses review of final regulations, permits and
state hazardous waste regulatory programs. 93 The legislative
history of RCRA is surprisingly sparse and provides little
guidance as to pre-enforcement review of administrative or-
ders. 94 RCRA's legislative history in 1976 only consisted of a
few pages.'95
RCRA was enacted by the Ninety-fourth Congress during
the Fall of 1976 to deal with the growing health and environ-
mental problems resulting from improper disposal of
wastes."" RCRA was designed to deal with the "rising tide of
scrap, discarded and waste materials"' 97 and to "reduce the
amount of waste .. .and ... provide for proper disposal and
economical solid waste disposal practices."' 98 RCRA was Con-
gress' first comprehensive effort to deal with the dangers
posed by mismanagement of hazardous substances.'99 At the
time RCRA was enacted, waste disposal consisted of dumping
barrels and drums, or sometimes liquids, into unlined
trenches and lagoons.2 0
RCRA's primary function is regulatory. RCRA regulates
the treatment, handling and disposal of hazardous wastes
through a "cradle to the grave" approach by regulating all as-
pects from generation to disposal. RCRA requires documenta-
tion as to the specific contents of a waste shipment, its origin,
and destination. Wastes are tracked through each link from
the "cradle" (the generation of hazardous wastes), to the
"grave", (disposal) and points between by a manifest system
forced using the procedures set forth in RCRA § 3008. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6927, 6928 (1988).
192. RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988).
193. See RCRA § 7006, 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (1988).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238.
195. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238.
196. See id. 6254-61.
197. RCRA § 1002(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(2) (1988).
198. RCRA § 1002(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
199. HALL, ET. AL., supra note 3.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-23 (1976).
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which requires documentation of each link by a manifest. 0'
Despite EPA's broad authority to issue administrative or-
ders for a variety of situations, the issue of pre-enforcement
review has been addressed by only a handful of courts. ' In
W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit refused to review potential permit modifications pur-
suant to a corrective action order under RCRA section
3004(u).2 °s In that case, W.R. Grace & Co. (Grace) challenged
the permit modification in question as violating due process
because it potentially imposed costs of millions of dollars to
drill a number of monitoring wells without providing Grace
any opportunity for an impartial review of the validity of the
modification requirements. 0 Although review of permits is
specifically provided for in RCRA section 7006(b), the court
held that section 7006(b) applied only to final permits and
that therefore the issue was not ripe for review. 0 5
Grace argued that due process was denied because review
after the permit was finalized would be moot since any addi-
tional wells required by EPA would already be drilled by the
time review was provided, and thus the damage to Grace
would be complete. 06 Further, Grace argued that if it failed to
comply with modifications, it would be subject to penalties of
up to $25,000 per day for violating a compliance order. 07
The court held that the issue was not ripe for review be-
cause EPA had not yet required a modification to the permit,
201. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.70-264.77 (1991).
202. W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1992); Sinclair Oil Co. v.
Scherer, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,009 (D. Wyo. June 30, 1989), vacated,
No. C88-0190-8 (July 23, 1991); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Daggett, 610 F.
Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
203. 959 F.2d 360 (lst Cir. 1992). In that case, EPA issued a draft corrective
action permit under § .3005(a). Section 3004(u) requires such permits to contain
schedules of corrective action compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988). The draft per-
mit at issue in Grace contained a modification provision whereby EPA was given the
power to choose methods of remediation that would become part of the final permit's
requirements. 959 F.2d at 362.
204. Id. at 364-65.
205. Id. at 366.
206. Id. at 363-64.
207. Id. Penalties for violating a section 3004(u) compliance order are authorized
under sections 3008(a) and (c). 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (c) (1988).
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and had not rejected any of Grace's groundwater monitoring
proposals.20 8 The court held that for an injunction to issue,
hardship could not consist of purely contingent harm. 09 Fur-
ther, since there was no concrete dispute, there was no direct
and immediate dilemma as required for ripeness. 10 Review of
the issue at that time, the court found, would deprive the
agency of the ability to resolve the issue. 1 '
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Daggett, E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont) sought a preliminary in-
junction to an administrative order issued by the EPA under
RCRA section 3013(a) requiring DuPont to submit a proposal
for groundwater monitoring at a landfill disposal facility. 212
DuPont alleged that section 3013 violated the due process
clause of the Constitution ' 3 because there was no opportunity
for judicial review prior to the imposition of penalties. 2' The
District Court for the Western District of New York found
that in order to avoid finding section 3013(a) unconstitutional,
pre-enforcement review was not precluded.1 8 The court re-
jected EPA's arguments that pre-enforcement review was pre-
cluded for section 3013(a) orders under the same rationale as
review had been precluded for CERCLA emergency hazard
abatement orders under CERCLA section 106(a),'2 1 and sec-
tion 120 of the Clean Air Act. ' The court specifically found
208. Id. at 364-65.
209. Id. at 366.
210. Id. at 365. See discussion, supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
211. Id. at 366.
212. 610 F. Supp. 260, 261-62 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
214. DuPont, 610 F. Supp. at 262.
215. Id. at 263.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
217. DuPont, 610 F. Supp. at 263. See CAA § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1988)
(amended 1990). The court stated,
Although the structure of the statute is somewhat similar to that of other
environmental laws that have been construed so as to bar pre-enforcement
review despite the possible accrual of substantial civil penalties, a finding of
unavailability of timely judicial scrutiny of the April 29th order is crucial to
plaintiff's instant due process challenge to section 6934. Timeliness in this
regard means that plaintiff must have, as it will, adequate opportunity to be
heard prior to any substantial impingement upon or derogation of its rights
or property.
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that RCRA section 3013(a) lacked the emergency abatement
rationale that supported preclusion of pre-enforcement review
under CERCLA. 1 8
In Sinclair Oil Co. v. Scherer,1 9 the District Court for
the District of Wyoming reviewed a section 7003 order despite
EPA's arguments that review of section 7003(a) should be
precluded for the same reasons that review of section 106(a)
orders under CERCLA is precluded. 220  Because section
7003(a) dealt with emergency abatement of "imminent and
substantial" endangerments to health or the environment,
EPA argued that pre-enforcement review must be denied.22'
The holding was subsequently vacated upon the entry of a
consent decree between EPA and Sinclair Oil Co.,222 leaving
the resolution of the issue in doubt.
A brief discussion of the Sinclair case may be useful in
fleshing out the issue of preclusion of administrative orders
under RCRA section 7003. The District Court for the District
of Wyoming recognized that the purpose of both RCRA sec-
tion 7003(a) and CERCLA section 106(a) was to provide
prompt response to emergency situations.223 The court ac-
knowledged the similarities of RCRA section 7003 to CER-
CLA section 106, and that other courts had barred section
106(a) from review because "pre-enforcement review of EPA's
remedial actions . . . [is] contrary to the policies underlying
CERCLA," and might "delay an effective response. ' 22 How-
ever, the court also pointed out that under the unique facts of
the case, Sinclair had already complied with the administra-
tive order at the time the case was brought, the emergency
had "largely been abated," and that "pre-enforcement judicial
610 F. Supp. at 263-264 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 263.
219. 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,009 (D. Wyo. June 30, 1989), vacated,
No. C88-0190-8 (July 23, 1991).
220. 20 Env. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,011-12.
221. Id.
222. Sinclair Oil Co! v. Scherer, No. C88-0190-8 (July 23, 1991).
223. 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,011.
224. Id. (citing Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986); Ami-
noil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
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review is appropriate in this particular case. '2 25 The court
stated:
Under these circumstances, the emergency response ob-
jective of [section] 7003(a) has been all but satisfied. Al-
lowing a review of the [section] 7003(a) order would not
undermine EPA's ability to swiftly respond to future
emergency conditions, or establish a precedent allowing
the recipient of such an order to evade or delay compli-
ance by seeking pre-enforcement review.221
Thus, the court was persuaded to review the order be-
cause the EPA brought forth no evidence that a delay in com-
pliance would result from hearing the case at that point.22 7
The Sinclair court relied on cases decided prior to the
enactment of CERCLA section 113(h), which expressly bars
review of CERCLA section 106(a) orders.228 However, the
court distinguished the case at bar from those prohibiting re-
view of CERCLA section 106(a) orders because the CERCLA
cases had all arisen as pre-compliance challenges to section
106(a) administrative orders.229 The court then went on to say
"[g]iven the presumption in favor of judicial review, and the
fact that neither the structure or the statutory scheme nor its
objectives preclude judicial review under such non-emergency
situations as presented in this case, summary judgment on the
[section 7003 order] on these grounds is appropriate."'2 30
Given that the issue of pre-enforcement review has only
been addressed three times under RCRA, it is difficult to de-
termine whether courts will determine that pre-enforcement
review of administrative orders is impliedly barred under
RCRA. Where the policies would most clearly bar pre-enforce-
ment review, in the case of emergency abatement orders
under section 7003, the single court considering the issue in
225. Id. at 20,011.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Sinclair rejected a bar to pre-enforcement review. On the
other hand, W.R. Grace & Co. barred pre-enforcement review
under non-emergency circumstances where there was great
potential costs to the recipient of the order. These decisions
were heavily dependent upon the factual situations involved
and do very little to establish a broadly applicable rule of law.
As will be discussed in the following section, the policies un-
derlying RCRA and the nature of its administrative order
scheme support a bar to pre-enforcement review for precisely
the same reasons that review has been barred under CER-
CLA, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
V. Analysis of Pre-enforcement Review Case Law
A. General Principles of Pre-enforcement Review in Non-
emergency Situations
The issue of whether pre-enforcement review of adminis-
trative orders is available may be analyzed on three levels.
First, review of an administrative order may be barred under
traditional administrative law principles of finality and ripe-
ness.23 1 Second, courts may construe the statute under which
the order is issued to determine whether pre-enforcement re-
view is impliedly barred." 2 Third, courts may analyze whether
pre-enforcement review is required under principles of due
process.
Even in the case of administrative orders issued in non-
emergency situations, a bar to pre-enforcement review under
the environmental statutes discussed is appropriate under
most circumstances. Under most environmental statutes, the
procedures for enforcement are such that there is no final
agency action until EPA seeks to enforce an order in district
court. Therefore, review must be precluded on ripeness
grounds. When a bar to pre-enforcement review may be im-
plied from the language of the statute, this same procedural
feature satisfies due process requirements because property
231. See supra notes 30-72, 124-27, 145-66, 182-87, 203-12 and accompanying
text.
232. See supra notes and accompanying text.
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rights cannot be said to be truly implicated until the order is
enforced by the courts.
1. Finality and Ripeness
The most important factor in each level of analysis will
be the procedural requirements for enforcement of an order
set forth in the statute. Because EPA's decision whether to
enforce an administrative order or not is discretionary, the is-
suance of an order is not "final" agency action subject to re-
view under the Administrative Procedure Act and therefore
the order is not ripe for review.23 This rationale has been ap-
plied to bar pre-enforcement review of administrative orders
under CERCLA 234 and the Clean Air Act.23 5 Barring pre-en-
forcement review based on finality is separate and distinct
from any express or implied preclusion of review under the
statute.
Under the enforcement procedures of administrative or-
ders under each of the statutes discussed, the recipient of an
order may refuse to comply or pay civil penalties until or-
dered by a district court.236 Thus, EPA has not taken the final
action required for enforcement until a decision is made to
seek enforcement of the order in the district courts. 37 A bar
to pre-enforcement review under the finality principle of ad-
ministrative judicial review is appropriate because resolution
of disputes may take place at the agency level, never requiring
judicial action.2 38 By the time pre-enforcement review is
sought, the EPA may not have developed adequate factual in-
formation required to make a final decision.239 By denying
pre-enforcement review, the courts accomplish the dual pur-
pose of deferring to agency authority in settling disputes while
conserving scarce judicial resources.
233. See supra notes 124-27, 145-66, 182-87, 203-12 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 145-66 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 146-230 and accompanying text.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991). See supra
notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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In some cases, agency actions are a mere assertion of ju-
risdiction, and not final agency action subject to judicial re-
view. This is most clearly the case in Army Corps of Engi-
neers' cease-and-desist orders issued under the Clean Water
Act.2' ° The same rationale may be applied to some types of
RCRA administrative orders which amount to an assertion of
jurisdiction, such as section 3013(a) orders for monitoring and
testing.2 '
Under the finality and ripeness doctrines, RCRA admin-
istrative orders which require a decision by the EPA to en-
force them in district court must be barred from review. Bar-
ring pre-enforcement review allows EPA to resolve the issue
with the recipient without ever bringing the issue to the
courts, and provides for the development of a factual record
in case the issue must be brought to court. The recipient of
the order is protected from arbitrary action by EPA through
review of the substantive merits of the order once EPA seeks
to enforce the order. If EPA never seeks to enforce the order,
it cannot be said that any property rights of the recipient
have been implicated. Furthermore, barring pre-enforcement
review of RCRA orders that require an EPA decision to en-
force based on finality or ripeness is consistent with the law as
applied to the other major federal environmental statutes.
2. Implied Preclusion of Pre-enforcement Review
Second, analysis may turn upon whether the statute ex-
pressly or impliedly precludes pre-enforcement review. For
240. Route 26 Land Dev. Ass'n v. United States, 753 F. Supp. 532, 539 (D. Del.
1990). See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
241. In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Daggett, 610 F. Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y.
1985), the court reviewed the requirements of a RCRA § 3013(a) order. The court
found the order valid in all respects, but allowed pre-enforcement review because of
the potential implication of the order on property rights, specifically rejecting argu-
ments that pre-enforcement review was barred under RCRA due to the need for
rapid responses to environmental problems. See supra notes 213-19 and accompany-
ing text. However, the court did not address the issues of finality or ripeness, and
there is no indication in the decision whether these issues were raised. The second
circuit in W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1992), however, has held
that pre-enforcement review of a § 2004(u) order was not ripe for review, notwith-
standing a due process argument. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
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those statutes that do not expressly preclude review, the anal-
ysis is based upon the structure, objectives, and legislative
history of each statutory scheme to determine whether pre-
enforcement review is impliedly precluded by the statute.2 42
Preclusion of review has been implied when a statute pro-
vides for judicial review of certain agency actions but is other-
wise silent as to pre-enforcement review.243 Implied preclusion
of review is also appropriate when the purposes and structure
of the statute are best served by denying review, as in the case
of prompt responses to emergency pollution episodes.2 44 For
some of the statutes, the emergency response rationale to bar
pre-enforcement review has been found to be necessary in any
situation where pollutants have been released.2 45 Thus, as will
be discussed in section V, part B, the recognized need for
rapid response has led courts to bar pre-enforcement review of
administrative orders issued under the Clean Air Act.246 How-
ever, that same rationale has not been applied to administra-
tive orders under RCRA as of yet.
3. Due Process
The third level of inquiry is constitutional: whether pre-
clusion of pre-enforcement review will constitute a denial of
due process. Barring pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders under CERCLA, the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act has been held to be in accordance with constitu-
tional due process requirements.247 When assessment of penal-
ties for the violation of administrative orders requires a hear-
ing, either a judicial hearing in the federal courts or a quasi-
judicial hearing at the agency level, courts have been more in-
clined to find pre-enforcement review is barred and in accor-
242. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). See supra
notes 84-86, 174-76 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
245. Under the Clean Air Act, the courts have held that the need for rapid re-
sponse to air pollutants requires a bar to pre-enforcement review. See supra notes
147-153 and accompanying text.
246. See in/ra notes 258-87 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 119-27, 157-66, 179-80, 207-12 and accompanying text.
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dance with the due process clause. 48
Because EPA must bring an action in district court to en-
force an order before any property rights are implicated, due
process is not denied under most administrative orders. Due
process cannot be violated unless liberty or property rights
are implicated. 49 When the decision of whether to seek judi-
cial enforcement of an order is discretionary, property inter-
ests are not implicated until the EPA decides to enforce the
order in the federal courts.2 50 If the order is legally insufficient
or otherwise invalid, courts can invalidate the order when
EPA seeks to enforce it, thereby providing due process to re-
cipients of the order at that time.251 The recipient is allowed a
full and fair opportunity to oppose the order before any depri-
vation of property occurs.
The recipient of an order is put in no worse position for
EPA's having issued a compliance order rather than immedi-
ately bringing an enforcement action in district court. 52 Due
process cannot be denied because the order merely requires
the recipient to comply with environmental laws that it was
otherwise subject to prior to the issuance of the order.253
Thus, as the courts have held, the effect of the order on due
process property or liberty rights is no greater than the sub-
stantive requirements of the environmental statute itself.' 5'
The argument that the accrual of large fines for failure to
comply with administrative orders violates due process at first
appears compelling. However, in all cases, the courts have a
clear opportunity to determine the merits of EPA's issuance
of an administrative order and any penalty assessment for
noncompliance before any fines are paid. The recipient of an
order who opposes its terms in good faith cannot be compelled
248. Id.
249. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Asbestec Constr Serv.
v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 770 (2d Cir. 1988). In Asbestec, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals indicated that a showing of interference with an actual contractual interest
might be enough to warrant review of the due process issue. Id.
250. See supra notes 119-27, 157-66, 180-81, 207-12 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 159, 165-66 and accompanying text.
254. Id.
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to take action until EPA brings a suit to enforce the order. 55
Thus, a predeprivation hearing is afforded before any actual
affect on property rights, satisfying the requirements of due
process. Furthermore, the courts may adjust fines to equitably
reflect a recipient's good faith opposition to an order, and any
delay in EPA's enforcement of the order that may have com-
pounded daily fines. 56
B. Orders Requiring a Rapid Response to Environmental
Hazards
In addition to conforming to finality and exhaustion doc-
trines of judicial review and satisfying due process, as de-
scribed above, a bar to pre-enforcement review of administra-
tive orders under the environmental statutes promotes the
policies underlying environmental protection. This is most
clearly true in the case of administrative orders issued in
emergency situations to abate "imminent and substantial en-
dangerments" to health or the environment, as provided for in
most of the environmental statutes. 57 In the case of imminent
and substantial endangerments, the Supreme Court's excep-
tion to review of administrative orders in emergency situa-
tions is especially applicable.2 58 Any delay in abatement,
remediation or removal action can risk human life or health
and worsen environmental damage, inevitably resulting in in-
creased costs of remediation and clean up of complex ecologi-
cal systems. Thus, the emergency nature of the administrative
action should be considered in determining whether pre-en-
forcement review is available. 5 9
255. The decision of whether to bring an enforcement action to seek penalties or
enforcement of an order is discretionary. See supra notes 119-27, 157-66, 180-81, 207-
12 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
257. Most of the environmental statutes contain provisions authorizing EPA to
issue administrative orders to immediately abate the hazard when environmental ca-
tastrophes threaten people or the environment with serious harm. See CERCLA §
106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988); RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988); CAA
§ 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. 11 1990); CWA § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1988); TSCA §
7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988).
258. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 96-127, 148-56, 180-81 and accompanying text.
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As aforementioned, CERCLA is the only statute authoriz-
ing issuance of administrative orders to abate environmental
hazards that expressly precludes review. By explicit congres-
sional mandate, pre-enforcement review of administrative or-
ders issued under CERCLA section 106(a) (emergency orders
to abate "imminent and substantial" hazards) or section 104
(remedial and response actions by EPA) is not available. 60
Under the Clean Water Act, any issues concerning pre-en-
forcement review of emergency administrative orders are
avoided because the statute requires the EPA to bring an ac-
tion directly in district court for abatement of the environ-
mental hazard.26'
Under the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, the issue of whether pre-enforcement re-
view of emergency administrative orders is available has not
been settled by the courts.2 2 In light of the case law discussed
in section IV of this paper, and given the policies underlying
emergency orders, pre-enforcement review of emergency
abatement orders under the CAA and RCRA must be barred.
The case for barring review of emergency administrative
orders under the CAA is easily made. Courts have already
barred pre-enforcement review of compliance orders under
the CAA that do not possess the urgency of emergency abate-
ment orders, citing the need for expedited enforcement of the
act nonetheless. 26 3 In addition to finding that pre-enforcement
review is barred by the finality and ripeness doctrines, an im-
plicit bar to review under the CAA is supported by the lan-
guage of section 307 of the Act.264
Under the analysis set forth in this discussion, pre-en-
forcement review of emergency orders issued under RCRA
260. See supra notes 105-27 and accompanying text. CERCLA § 113(h), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). Exceptions to the bar to pre-enforcement review are listed in
section 113(h), or may be had when state law provides standards of cleanup that may
be at issue. Id.
261. See CWA §§ 311(e), 504, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(e), 1364 (1988). See also section
7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, TSCA § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988).
262. See supra notes 128-66, 188-231.
263. See supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
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clearly must be barred. This result is required due to the need
for rapid action to abate releases of hazardous wastes under
the rationale set forth by courts analyzing the issue pursuant
to the CAA and CERCLA. The analogies between the RCRA
and CERCLA imminent hazard provisions, and the fact that
courts barred pre-enforcement review of CERCLA orders
prior to the SARA amendments when the statute was silent,
support a bar to pre-enforcement review for RCRA orders.
Additionally, the procedural scheme for issuance of RCRA
emergency orders requires EPA to bring an action in district
court to enforce them, thereby avoiding denial of due process,
and precluding review based on finality and ripeness doc-
trines. Finally, RCRA's explicit provision for judicial review of
other agency actions tends to strengthen arguments that pre-
enforcement review should be barred.
The imminent hazard provisions of RCRA and CERCLA
contain nearly identical language and have a very similar pur-
pose.2"5 Under both statutes, when hazardous substances (or
wastes, in the case of RCRA) pose an "imminent and substan-
tial endangerment" to health or the environment, the EPA
may bring suit in district court or issue administrative orders
for abatement of the imminent hazard.26 CERCLA section
106(a)2 11 and RCRA section 7003(a)26 8 grant EPA the author-
ity to bring abatement actions when there "may" be an "im-
minent and substantial endangerment" to health or the envi-
ronment.269 Under most circumstances, the EPA may take
action under either provision depending on the specific
265. The purpose of RCRA § 7003(a) is to provide EPA with emergency powers
to respond to similar emergency situations as those addressed by CERCLA section
106(a). See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (Section 7003(a) "was
intended to confer 'overriding authority to respond to situations involving a substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment.'" Id. at 213 (quoting H.R. COMM.
PRINT No. 96-IFC 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979)).
266. See RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988); CERCLA § 106(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 6 9 73(a) (1988).
269. RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988); CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. §
9606(a) (1988).
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situation.270
The single case addressing the issue of whether RCRA
emergency abatement orders are reviewable allowed review
under unusual factual circumstances, but later the decision
was vacated. In Sinclair Oil Co. v. Scherer, the court reviewed
an emergency hazard abatement order issued under RCRA
section 7003(a) despite the court's recognition of the strong
policies supporting preclusion of pre-enforcement review of
emergency abatement orders.27  However, the court was care-
ful to distinguish the Sinclair facts from the earlier CERCLA
cases, and pointed out that in the case at bar, the emergency
270. In practice, EPA may prefer using the CERCLA imminent hazard provi-
sions because of the substantial body of case law establishing strict, retroactive, and
joint and several liability upon responsible parties.
Although there is a considerable amount of overlap between the two sections,
CERCLA applies only to "hazardous substances" while RCRA § 7003 applies to solid
or hazardous wastes. Compare CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) with
RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988) and 40 C.F.R. Part 261 (1990). Hazard-
ous substances as defined by CERCLA encompasses RCRA hazardous wastes as well
as pollutants identified in the CWA, the CAA, and the TSCA. There are three poten-
tial situations in which a RCRA § 7003(a) order can be issued and a CERCLA § 106
order cannot: (1) When the endangerment is caused by solid waste rather than haz-
ardous waste; (2) when the waste is hazardous under the statutory definition at
RCRA § 1004(5), but is not listed in 40 C.F.R. Part 261; or (3) when the waste is a
petroleum product or constituent which is excluded under CERCLA. Id. Exception
(1) arises because RCRA § 7003(a) explicitly applies to "solid waste or hazardous
waste." 42 U.S.C. 6973(a) (1988). Exception (2) arises because wastes which are not
listed or for which characteristics have not been identified by the EPA under the
regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 261 (1991), promulgated pursuant to RCRA § 3001, 42
U.S.C. § 6921 (1988), may be still be hazardous under section 7003 if the statutory
elements for an imminent hazard action are established. See 40 C.F.R. §
261.1(b)(2)(1990). Since the RCRA hazardous wastes that are defined as CERCLA
hazardous substances in § 101(14) are limited to those hazardous wastes listed at 40
C.F.R. Part 261, and wastes subject to abatement under RCRA § 7003(a) are not so
restricted, RCRA § 7003(a) may be used to abate hazards posed by solid or hazardous
wastes not covered under CERCLA by § 106.
Another potential difference in application of the two provisions is that the CER-
CLA provision has been applied only to potentially responsible parties, defined gener-
ally as owners and operators of facilities, found in CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a) (1988), while the RCRA imminent hazard provision applies to the much
broader class defined by "any person." RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. 6973 (1988). Thus,
RCRA § 7003 can be applied to persons not necessarily owning or operating a hazard-
ous waste facility. The implications of this difference are potentially quite broad.
271. 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,009 (D. Wyo. June 30, 1989), vacated,
No. C88-0190-8 (July 23, 1991).
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situation was largely abated.272
In practice, the EPA has used both RCRA section 7003(a)
and CERCLA section 106(a) to compel cleanup of active and
inactive hazardous waste dump sites, often using both provi-
sions in the same case.27 3 In 1980, Congress expanded the au-
thority of section 7003 by authorizing EPA to issue "such or-
ders as may be necessary to protect public health and the
environment." '74 The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments (HSWA) of 1984275 settled a dispute concerning section
7003 when Congress amended the language of section 7003(a)
to include facilities where past disposal practices presented an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" by amending the
language to include past owners and operators of TSD facili-
ties, generators, or transporters of hazardous wastes. 276 Prior
272. Id. See supra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
273. See generally Joel A. Mintz, Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites and the
RCRA Imminent Hazard Provision: Some Suggestions for a Sound Judicial Con-
struction, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 247 (1987); DONALD W. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL
REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE § 6.05[1] (1991)("Shortly after CERCLA was
signed into law, the Department of Justice began amending the complaints in the
pending Section 7003 actions to include a separate claim for relief under Section
106(a).").
274. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5028-5043.
275. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (Nov. 8, 1984).
276. HSWA Amendments, Section 402, Title IV-Provisions Relating Primarily
to Subtitle G of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
SEC. 402. Section 7003(a) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act is amended by-
(1) inserting 'past or present' after 'evidence that the';
(2) striking 'to immediately restrain any person' and inserting in lieu thereof
'against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility) who has contributed or who is';
(3) striking 'to stop' and inserting in lieu thereof 'to restrain such person
from';
(4) striking 'or to take such other action as may be necessary' and substitut-
ing ', to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or
both'; and
(5) inserting after the first sentence thereof the following: 'A transporter shall
not be deemed to have contributed or to be contributing to such handling,
storage, treatment, or disposal taking place after such solid waste or hazard-
ous waste has left the possession or control of such transporter if the trans-
portation of such waste was under a sole contractual arrangement arising
from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by common carrier by rail
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to this clarification, some courts,2 " and even EPA, considered
that section 7003 only applied to current disposal." 8
Taking into account the purposes of the respective stat-
utes, the policy rationale supporting a bar to pre-enforcement
review of emergency administrative orders under RCRA is in
many ways even stronger than under CERCLA. CERCLA was
enacted to deal with perceived problems in cleaning up sites
contaminated by past disposal of hazardous substances. 9
RCRA, on the other hand, deals with past disposal of hazard-
ous wastes as well as regulation of current hazardous waste
disposal.28 ° Thus, it would seem less likely that emergency sit-
uations would arise involving these hazardous substances that
were placed in landfills many years ago as compared with the
potential for emergency situations at facilities that are cur-
rently receiving hazardous wastes and are regulated by RCRA.
If administrative orders under CERCLA, which is intended to
deal with past disposal of hazardous wastes, are barred from
review because of the need for swift action in emergency haz-
ard situations, then why should not the same types of orders
under a similar provision of RCRA, which regulates ongoing
disposal of hazardous waste, be similarly barred?
The HSWA amendments provide some support for the
argument that Congress considered CERCLA section 106(a)
and RCRA section 7003(a) analogous. In discussing the enact-
ment of CERCLA section 106(a), Congress stated that the
"EPA should continue to use [CERCLA section 106(a)] ex-
pansively and no implication should be drawn from this sec-
tion of the bill that the Congress intends to narrow the ex-
isting section 7003. ''281
Congress did address some aspects of judicial review of
and such transporter has exercised due care in the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation and disposal of such waste.'
277. See United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States
v. Waste Indus., No. 80-4-Civ-7 (E.D.N.C. June 11, 1985); United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
278. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 195-202 and accompanying text.
281. See HSWA Amendments, Section 233-Interim Status Corrective Action
Orders, House Conference Rep. No. 98-1133, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
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section 7003 in the HSWA amendments. The legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress intended that EPA's decisions
whether to settle section 7003 orders are not subject to judi-
cial review.28 ' Judicial review of section 7003 orders is also
barred in citizen enforcement suits under section 7002.83
However, Congress was silent on the issue of whether judicial
review of section 7003(a) orders was available.
Congress' total silence on whether section 7003 orders are
reviewable exacerbates the problems of interpretation. One
argument for review is that if Congress had intended to pre-
clude review of section 7003 orders, it would have done so in
the HSWA amendments where judicial review was certainly
an issue, at least in the context of other RCRA provisions.
The argument could be made that since review of section
7003(a) orders is expressly barred in citizen suits and EPA
settlements, one may infer that section 7003(a) orders are oth-
erwise reviewable.2 84 The argument goes, if Congress did not
include an express provision for review of section 7003 orders,
it intended that they were not reviewable, and therefore there
is no need to amend RCRA to expressly bar review. This is
exactly what EPA argued in the Sinclair case, that silence is a
clear indication that pre-enforcement review was intended to
be precluded.18 5
The inferences seem to be in favor of preclusion of pre-
enforcement review of section 7003(a) orders, but do not rise
to the level of clear and convincing evidence of intent to pre-
clude review. 2 86 However, given the policy of rapid abatement
of environmental hazards, the procedural requirements for en-
forcement of the orders, and the finality and ripeness issues,
the better rule of law would bar pre-enforcement review of
emergency administrative orders under RCRA.
282. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,
98 Stat. 3221 (Nov. 8, 1984)(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) (1988)).
283. See the citizen suit provision, RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
284. RCRA § 7002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988).
285. Sinclair Oil Co. v. Scherer, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,009, 20,011
(D. Wyo. June 30, 1989), vacated, No. C88-0190-8 (July 23, 1991). 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.).
286. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
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VI. Conclusion
The courts have barred pre-enforcement review when
EPA issues administrative orders that require enforcement by
a district court action, .either through finding an implicit bar
to review or that review is precluded under finality and ripe-
ness analysis. It is well established that in certain situations
pre-enforcement review may be barred to ensure that environ-
mental damage is not exacerbated by the delay of litigation or
inaction by the EPA or responsible parties. Cleaning up
hazards to the environment rapidly will be, in most cases, to
the benefit of all - the EPA, the responsible party, and the
public.
Recipients of administrative orders have little to gain by
delay, and a lot to lose. Waiting may put off the inevitable
declaration that the responsible party is liable, but can in-
crease the total costs of cleanup dramatically. It is better to
address pollution episodes rapidly before they spread to do
more expensive harm.
In those statutes where Congress has not spoken, a bar to
pre-enforcement review should be enacted to avoid a needless
waste of resources litigating the issue. The potential environ-
mental damage is simply too uncertain to leave it up to the
courts to dig through statutory language and legislative his-
tory for the slightest of hints that Congress did or did not
intend to bar pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders.
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